Differential private POI queries via Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform by Yang, Mengmeng et al.
 DRO  
Deakin Research Online, 
Deakin University’s Research Repository  Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B 
Differential private POI queries via Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform 
Citation:  
Yang, Mengmeng, Zhu, Tianqing, Liu, Bo, Xiang, Yang and Zhou, Wanlei 2018, Differential 
private POI queries via Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform, IEEE access, vol. 6, pp. 29685-
29699. 
DOI: http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2840726 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018, IEEE 
Reproduced within the terms of the IEEE OAPA (Open Access Publishing Agreement). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Downloaded from DRO: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30111996 
Received April 3, 2018, accepted May 15, 2018, date of publication May 28, 2018, date of current version June 20, 2018.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2840726
Differential Private POI Queries via
Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transform
MENGMENG YANG1, TIANQING ZHU 2,3, BO LIU 4, YANG XIANG 5, (Senior Member, IEEE),
AND WANLEI ZHOU 3,6, (Senior Member, IEEE)
1School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Melbourne, VIC 3125, Australia
2School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wuhan Polytechnic University, Wuhan 430023, China
3School of Software, University of Technology Sydney, Ultimo, NSW 2007, Australia
4Department of Engineering, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC 3086, Australia
5Digital Research and Innovation Capability Platform, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, VIC 3122, Australia
6College of Information Science and Technology, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
Corresponding author: Tianqing Zhu (tianqing.zhu@uts.edu.au)
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61502362 and in part by the Australia
Research Council Linkage under Grant LP170100123.
ABSTRACT The growing popularity of location-based services is giving untrusted servers relatively free
reign to collect huge amounts of location information from mobile users. This information can reveal far
more than just a user’s locations but other sensitive information, such as the user’s interests or daily routines,
which raises strong privacy concerns. Differential privacy is a well-acknowledged privacy notion that has
become an important standard for the preservation of privacy. Unfortunately, existing privacy preservation
methods based on differential privacy protect user location privacy at the cost of utility, aspects of which
have to be sacrificed to ensure that privacy is maintained. To solve this problem, we present a new privacy
framework that includes a semi-trusted third party. Under our privacy framework, both the server and
the third party only hold a part of the user’s location information. Neither the server nor the third party
knows the exact location of the user. In addition, the proposed perturbation method based on the Johnson
Lindenstrauss transform satisfies the differential privacy. Two popular point of interest queries, k-NN and
Range, are used to evaluate the method on two real-world data sets. Extensive comparisons against two
representative differential privacy-based methods show that the proposed method not only provides a strict
privacy guarantee but also significantly improves performance.
INDEX TERMS Differential privacy, Johnson Lindenstrauss transform, location privacy, LBS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive diffusion of GPS-enabled devices has provided
tremendous opportunities for the development of location-
based services (LBSs). A typical example is providing rec-
ommendations about nearby points of interest (POIs). A user
queries an LBS with their current location, and the LBS
returns the corresponding POIs. Even though LBSs pro-
vide great benefits, they come at the cost of exposing a
user’s location. Where a person is, is sensitive information.
It can easily be linked to highly confidential details, such as
their home address, and their religious practices. Therefore,
devising a solution that allows users to benefit from LBSs
while guaranteeing the privacy of their location is highly
desirable.
Numerous location privacy protection methods have been
proposed in the last decade. Most solutions proposed in
the literature are based on location obfuscation. The basic
idea is to transform the user’s exact location into a region
large enough to thwart attacks, also known as cloaking
region [1]. Unfortunately, most location obfuscation tech-
niques proposed rely on syntactic approaches such as k-
anonymity, which cannot provide rigorous privacy [2].
In addition, Dewri [3] highlighted the inadequacy of cloak-
ing regions in preventing location privacy breaches when
the adversary grasps some approximate location knowledge
about the user. Another class of technique is Private Informa-
tion Retrieval (PIR), which uses cryptography to protect the
user’s location information [4]. This technique allows a user
to query POIs without revealing any information about the
query. However, while LBS queries based on PIR provides
strong cryptographic guarantees, they are often computation-
ally and communicationally expensive and not practical in
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addition to requiring different query plans to be designed for
different query types [2].
Differential privacy, a powerful privacy model, is widely
accepted for providing rigorous privacy guarantees for aggre-
gate data analysis [5]. It ensures that one individual cannot
significantly affect the output of a query. Differential privacy
is normally achieved by injecting randomnoise to the result of
the query. Applying differential privacy for location protec-
tion is still at its early stage [2]. Dewri [3] proposed a differen-
tial location perturbation method that added Laplace noise to
the x and y coordinate separately. Bordenabe et al. [6] intro-
duced a generalized privacy notation geo-indistinguishability
to formalize the problem of location privacy preserving.
Palia and Tandon [7] further considered the impact of prior
information about POIs on the utility. All of them need
to add significant noise to hide the user’s exact location
in the safe region, which reduces the accuracy of returned
POIs.
In this paper, we propose a new Johnson Lindenstrauss
transform based location privacy protection method. The
Johnson Lindenstrauss lemma states that a small set of points
in a high dimensional space can be embedded into a much
lower dimension that the Euclidean distances between the
points can be nearly preserved [8]. Therefore, the basic idea of
the proposed method is that transfer the user’s exact location
together with the map into another dimension in such a way
that the adversary has no idea the user’s exact location but the
relative distances between POIs are maintained that helps to
find nearby POIs.
There are several challenges in applying Johnson Linden-
strauss transform in the location privacy protection. First,
how to evaluate the privacy level protected by the John-
son Lindenstrauss transform? Blocki et al. [9] proved that
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform preserves edge differ-
ential privacy in graph sanitization. Based on this finding,
we show that it also guarantees differential privacy in a
location dataset. Second, how to return the accurate POIs
without disclosing it to the service provider? We solve this
challenge by introducing a semi-trusted third party who
in charge of transferring the map and return anonymized
encrypted POIs. In such way, the service provider only access
the transformed dataset, while the third party access the orig-
inal POI information, the exact queried POI information can
be returned to the user by third party and service provider
intersection without disclosing location privacy to either
party.
Overall, our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a new privacy framework that introduces a
semi-trusted third party to protect user locations regard-
less of adversaries background knowledge.
2) We present a location perturbation method based
on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform that sat-
isfies differential privacy. The proposed method
not only guarantees rigorous privacy preservation
but also allows LBS providers to provide accurate
services.
3) We systematically analyze how the proposed method
can defend against various background knowledge
attacks while providing high-quality services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the preliminaries. We propose our privacy preser-
vation framework and apply it to two basic POI queries in
Section III and Section IV respectively. Section VI details the
results of the experiments. Section VII discusses the related
work and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy is a provable privacy notation that has
emerged as an important standard for preserving privacy in
a variety of areas [5].
Definition 1 (-Differential Privacy): A randomized algo-
rithmM gives -differential privacy for any pair of neigh-
bouring datasets D and D′, and for every set of outcomes ,
M satisfies:
Pr[M(D) ∈ ] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ ]. (1)
Datasets D and D′ are neighbouring datasets, which only
differ in one individual record.
B. THE JOHNSON-LINDENSTRAUSS TRANSFORM
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform, also known as the
famous Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma, is a random projec-
tion that projects points in a high dimension to a lower
dimensional space while preserving the Euclidean distances
between any pair of points [10]. Its formal definition is pre-
sented as follows:
Lemma 1 (Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma [10]): For any
set S of n points in Rd , given 0 < δ < 1/2, m =
(log(n)/δ2), there is a matrix X ∈ Rm×d , for all u, v ∈ S,
there is a map f : Rd → Rm, such that
(1− δ)‖u− v‖2 ≤ ‖f (u)− f (v)‖2 ≤ (1+ δ)‖u− v‖2. (2)
in which, f (u) = Xu, f (v) = Xv.
The Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma states that there exist
a random matrix X can project the dataset from d dimension
to m dimension while maintaining the Euclidean distance
between records. Several constructions for X have been pro-
posed [11]. A Gaussian distribution is used to generate a
random matrix X in this paper.
III. LOCATION PRIVACY PRESERVATION FRAMEWORK
BASED ON A THIRD PARTY
A. NOTATIONS
Let U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} be a set of users. Each user has
a true location and a perturbed location. The true location
coordinates are denoted as lt (x, y), the perturbed location is
denoted as anm dimension location vector lp(c1, c2, . . . , cm).
M is the map matrix, whose records are POI location coordi-
nates, Assume there are t POIs in the map, then M ∈ Rt×2.
Mˆ ∈ Rt×m is the perturbed map matrix. Important symbols
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TABLE 1. Notations.
used in this section and following parts of the paper are listed
in Table 1 for reference.
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTION
Problem Definition. In this paper, we consider the location
privacy problem in the popular location-based service where
the user queries the LBS server for nearby POIs. However,
the service provider may be untrusted and attacked by outside
attackers. Therefore, we define the problem as follows:
Problem 1: Given a user who has a location lt (x, y),
P{p1, p2, . . . , pk} is the nearby POIs of the user. Design a
location privacy protection method, through which, the ser-
vice provider has no idea the user’s exact location, while the
returned POI set P′ should have the following character: the
value of |PaP′| should as small as possible.
Assumptions: To make the problem clear, we can make a
few reasonable assumptions.
1) The third party will hold the map information.
This is reasonable as many LBSs use public maps, e.g.,
Google Maps. The third party could even be a map
provider.
2) The third party is semi-trusted.
We assume the third party in our privacy framework is
semi-trusted with following characters:
• It curious about the user’s location information;
• It follows the process of POI queries;
• It does not collude with the service provider.
C. FRAMEWORK
The proposed location privacy preservation framework con-
tains three components as illustrated in Fig. 1.
1) USERS
Users are people with GPS-enabled devices who ask for
location-based services. They prefer to mask their exact
locations. Therefore, location information will be perturbed
before sending from the device. User devices are assumed
to be trusted. Any malicious software would not be able to
access the position sensor [12].
2) SERVICE PROVIDER
Service providers are application platforms that provide
location-based services, such as Google Maps, Foursquare,
and Yelp. These providers require a user’s location to deliver
high-quality services to an individual. Service providers may
be untrusted. In our proposed framework, a service provider
FIGURE 1. Location privacy framework.
receives a query directly from a user and returns the encrypted
POIs received from a third party.
3) THIRD PARTY
The third party is semi-trusted and does not collude with the
service provider. It holds a portion of the location information
and acts as a bridge between the user and the service provider.
The third party may acquire the map used by the service
provider to provide location-based services, and it also has the
essential tasks of perturbing the map and helping the service
provider return highly accurate POIs.
As a basic outline of the entire process: (a) a user perturbs
their location locally using the transition matrix X ; (b) the
user query the service provider for nearby POI and query the
third party for map sanitization; (c) the third party perturbs
the map accordingly; (d) the service provider searches for
anonymized POIs, asks the third party for exact POI infor-
mation and forwards them back to the user.
D. PRIVACY PROTECTION SCHEME BASED ON
JOHNSON-LINDENSTRAUSS TRANSFORM
In this section, we introduce a perturbation method based
on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform that operates within
the proposed privacy framework. Blocki et al. [9] show that
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform allows us to publish a
sanitized graph that preserves edge differential privacy. Based
on that, we prove that the Johnson-Lindenstrass transform
preserves differential privacy for location dataset as well.
According to the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, the trans-
formation can keep the relative distances between points.
Therefore, it works well for answering POI queries, which
is based on Euclidean distance. The details of the procedure
are explained in the following parts.
a. A user has access to their location coordinates through
their GPS-enabled devices, and these are perturbed by a
linear transition matrix X ∈ Rm. The details are shown in
Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Location Perturbation
Require: user ui’s location lt (xi, yi), projected dimension m.
Ensure: perturbed location lp, transformation matrix X ∈
R2×m.
1: for i = 1 to 2 do
2: for j = 1 to m do
3: Sample X [i, j] from Gaussian distribution N (0, 1);
4: end for
5: end for
6: lp← ltX;
7: return lp, X .
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed location perturbation
method. First, a random transition matrix X is generated,
which is constructed in Steps 1 to 5. X is a 2 × m matrix
and the entries for X are sampled from a 0 mean Gaussian
distribution. We perturb the user’s location by multiplying
the original location coordinate with X at Step 6. Step 6 is
the process of Johnson Lindenstrauss transform. After trans-
formation, the user’s location information is changed from
a location coordinate (x, y) to a meaningless location vector
(c1, c2, . . . cm). We prove that the transformation satisfies
- differential privacy in Section. V-A.
b. The user chooses one region R that he/she feels com-
fortable with and generates a key pair (sk, pk). Then, he/she
queries the LBS nearby POIs using the perturbed location,
and query the third party for map sanitization by sending
the transition matrix X , region R, public key, and queries
type to the third party. As the user’s location coordinates
are perturbed by matrix X , to guarantee the utility, the map
should also be perturbed by the same matrix, after which the
relative distances between user and POIs can be preserved.
Both the service provider and the third party hold partial
location information about the user. None of them can obtain
the location of the user with only partial information.
c. Once the third party receives the map sanitization query,
it transforms the region R’s map with queried POI type using
X . The relative distances between the records and user can
be maintained because they have been transferred using the
same transition matrix. The perturbed map is anonymized,
after which it can be sent to the service provider. Fig. 2 shows
an example of the map sanitization results.
Assume the user queries the nearby restaurants. The
table on the left shows the sampled original map. Each
restaurant has a geographic location coordinate. Assume
the transition matrix is 2-dimensional, denoted by X =[
1.7892 −0.6749
1.3847 1.5175
]
, resulting in perturbed location vectors
shown in the right-hand side table. The location of the restau-
rants are totally changed and the names are replace by the
meaningless number.
d. The service provider searches for POIs based on the
perturbed locations and send them to the third party together
with another K − 1 sets of POIs within safe region, where
FIGURE 2. Map sanitization.
FIGURE 3. The process of k-anonymization.
K is the number of POI set. As the POIs found by the
service provider are the meaningless number with the per-
turbed location, the third party will need to find the corre-
sponding POIs by searching a mapping list. To avoid the
third party gets the queried POIs by the user, the POIs cal-
culated by the service provider are protected by k-anonymity
technology shown in Fig. 3. The left hand side table is the
searched POIs, denote as set 1. the right hand side table is the
K -anonymized POI sets. There are totally K sets. The right
hand side figure shows that the K − 1 sets of POIs are
randomly chosen from the safe region. Therefore, the third
party has no idea which sets are the queried POIs. The value
of K is determined by the user. The probability of identify
the user queried POIs is 1/K . A bigger value of K means
harder to identify the returned POIs for the third party. Users
can choose it according to their own privacy consideration.
The upper bound of K value is controlled under 20, which
is big enough to prevent the POIs being identified. K sets of
real POIs information will be returned to the service provider.
In order to prevent the service provider from obtaining the
accurate POIs information, the returned K sets of POIs are
encrypted using user’s public key. And the queried POIs are
filtered according to the POI ID and returned to the user by
the service provider.
The service provider is ‘‘blind’’ during the whole POIs
query process. As shown in Table. 2, it knows nothing about
the user’s query. The service provider only receives a location
vector. Therefore, it has no idea the user’s exact location.
During the searching POIs process, the service provider just
accesses to the anonymized meaningless records. Therefore,
it has no idea what the type of these POIs and which POIs
these records refer to. For the third party, it needs to trans-
form the map according to the user’s requirement. Therefore,
it knows the user’s query type, such as restaurants and cinema.
However, the third party has no idea the user’s location and
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TABLE 2. Information access.
returned POIs as well, because the third party never receives
any location information of the user and only access the k
anonymized POIs. Besides, using this privacy framework,
the service provider can return very accurate POIs due to
the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform’s ability to maintain
relative Euclidean distances between records.
In the proposed privacy preservation method, the third
party needs to encrypt the received POIs. Assume the num-
ber of queried POI is k , the third party needs to compute
Kk encryptions, where K is the number of sets of POIs.
In addition, the user needs to compute 1 decryption. There-
fore, the total computation complexity for encryption is
O(Kk + 1) exp. As the number k is small, the computation
complexity caused by the encryption part is acceptable. The
proposed privacy framework supports the two most popular
spatial queries: k-nearest POIs queries and range queries. In
Section IV, we present the details of how these queries are
processed in our privacy model.
IV. PRIVACY PROTECTION ALGORITHMS FOR TWO
BASIC POI QUERIES
A. K-NEAREST POI QUERIES
Consider an application that the user wants to query the k-
nearest POIs around his location. The query can be ’where is
the k nearest restaurants’.
1) k-NEAREST POIs QUERY GENERATION
It has two main operations for user: location perturbation
and query generation. The specific steps are shown in Algo-
rithm 2.
Algorithm 2 k-Nearest POIs Query (User)
Require: user ID, ui’s location lt , POI number k , POI set
number K , dimension m.
Ensure: k-nearest POIs POIs.
1: Perturb user’s location information using location pertur-
bation method, get the perturbed location lp.
2: Query LBS provider POIs with perturbed location lp.
3: Generate a key pair sk and pk using RSA algorithm.
4: Choose a safe region R.
5: Query the third party map sanitization with user ID,
transformation matrix X , safe region, queried POI type,
and public key.
6: return Obtain POIs from the service provider
• Location perturbation. The user’s location lt can be
transferred into a meaningless location vector lp using
a Johnson transformation matrix (Step 1).
lp← f (lt ,m), (3)
where m is the dimension of the new location vector,
which is specified by users. f is the function of the
transformation.
• Query generation. The query sent to the service provider
is in the following form:
query← 〈userID, k, lp,K 〉 , (4)
where k is the number of queried POIs, and K refers to
the number of POIs sets.
User query k-nearest POIs using perturbed location lp
(Step 2). As lp is a 1 × m vector, the service provider
cannot find any relationship between this vector and the
user’s location without the transition matrix X .
The user generates a key pair in Step 3, which is used
to encrypt the POI information. A safe region R is
chosen by the user in Step 4. The safe region means
the user does not mind other people knows that he/she
is in region R. While defining a safe region helps the
third party transformed less data, which increase the
algorithm efficiency. The query sent to the third party
is in the following form:
query← 〈userID,X ,R,POI − type, pk〉 . (5)
The public key together with the transition matrix, safe
region, and POI type are sent to the third party for map
sanitization in Step 5. The user ID is also included in
the query, such that the service provider can find the
corresponding perturbed map for each specific query. At
the end, the user can get the queried POIs from service
provider shown in Step 6.
To guarantee utility, the map should be perturbed by the
same transition matrix as the user’s location. However, if the
service provider knows the perturbed location vector and the
transition matrix at the same time, the true location coordi-
nates of the user would be disclosed. Therefore, this task is
assigned to the third party.
2) MAP SANITIZATION
After the third party gets a query from the user, it starts to
sanitize the map. Algorithm 3 shows the process.
First, the third party samples a small map according to
the received user’s safe region R and the queried POI type
in Step 1 and perturbs it using received transition matrix X
in Step 2. To avoid the service provider inferring the real
POIs information, the transformed POIs are anonymized by
replacing the identifiers by meaningless numbers in Step 3.
The sanitized map is sent to the service provider for k-nearest
POIs calculation in Step 4. After that, the third party will
get K sets of k nearest POIs from the service provider. In
step 5, the service provider finds the POIs real information
according to the mapping function f , and encrypt it using
encrypt algorithm in Step 6. The encrypted POIs are in the
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Algorithm 3Map Sanitization (Third Party)
Require: mapM, user ID, transformation matrix X , queried
POI type, safe region R
Ensure: POIs.
1: Sample a small map M with same POI type required in
the query in region R from the mapM.
2: Perturb the map M . f : Mˆ X←− MX ,
3: Anoymize the perturbed map Mˆ . Mˆa← Mˆ .
4: Send the map Mˆa to LBS provider with the user ID.
After getting the k anonymized POI sets POIsa from
service provider :
5: Find the real POIs information according to the mapping
function f .
6: Encrypt the POIs information: Enc(POIs)← POIs, and
send the encrypted POIs back to the service provider.
format of < ID,Enc(POIs) >. At the end, the encrypted real
POIs information is sent back to the service provider.
3) SEARCH NEARBY POIs
After receives the user’s POI query and the sanitized map, the
service provider searches the nearby POIs blindly.
Algorithm 4 Response POI Queries (LBS Server)
Require: User ID, ui’s perturbed location lp, user’ query Q
anonymized perturbed map Mˆa.
Ensure: POIsa.
1: Find the corresponding map Mˆa according to the user ID.
2: for i = 1 to length(Mˆa) do
3: dis(i)← Euclidean distance between lp and Ma(i);
4: end for
5: POIsa← find the POIs corresponding to k smallest dis;
6: Send POIsa to the third party;
7: POIsa ← find other K sets of k closest POIs randomly
within the map.
8: Send POIsa to the third party.
After getting the encrypted accurate POI information
from the third party
9: Filter out the queried POI information according to the
ID and return them back to the user.
10: return POIsa
Algorithm 4 shows how to find the k-nearest POIs based
on the perturbed information. First, the perturbed map Mˆa
is searched according to the user’s ID if there are multiple
query users at the same time. Then, the distances between
the perturbed locations of the POIs and the user’s perturbed
location are calculated in Steps 2 to Step 4. The k-closest
POIs and another K sets of k closest POIs are chosen in
FIGURE 4. JL transform for k-NN queries. (a) Original locations.
(b) Perturbed locations.
FIGURE 5. JL transform for range queries with radius r . (a) Original
locations. (b) Perturbed locations.
Step 5 and 6 separately. All of them are sent to the third party
in such way, the third party has no idea the returned POIs
to the user and cannot infer the user’s exact location. After
getting the encrypted accurate POI information, the LBS
server will filter out the records corresponding to the POIs
obtained in Step 5 and return them to the user. The user can
get the accurate POI information by decrypting it using the
private key.
Although the server has no idea where the user is, the
k-nearest POIs can still be found accurately. Fig. 4 provides
an example. The blue dots are the true locations of restaurants
around user u. The red dots are the perturbed restaurant
locations. The different restaurants are denoted as ri for
simplicity. Although the geographic positions are changed
after the transformation, the relative distances are essentially
unchanged. For example, in the original map, the two nearest
restaurants are r3 and r4, while in the perturbedmap, we reach
the same conclusion.
B. RANGE QUERIES
An example of a range query is ’List all restaurants within
100mof the user.’ In this section, we present how the proposed
privacy framework to process range query.
1) RANGE QUERY GENERATION
A privacy-preserving range query process is similar to
k-NN query. However, the queried radius r cannot be used
on the perturbed map directly because even though the rela-
tive distance is essentially the same after the transformation,
the actual distance between any two locations has changed.
Therefore, directly using the radius r would introduce a large
error. Fig. 5 shows an example.
Assume a user queries restaurants within a radius r .
In the original dataset, there are four restaurants 〈r1, r3, r4, r5〉.
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Algorithm 5 Range Queries (User)
Require: user ID, ui’s location lt (x, y), range r , dimension
m, transformationmatrixX , queried POI type, safe region
R, K .
Ensure: POIs in range r POIa.
1: lp← f (lt ,m);
2: si = (x + xcosθi, y+ ysinθi);
3: sˆi← f (si,m);
4: rˆ =
∑
dsi,lp
|si| ;
5: Query1←
〈
userID, rˆ, lp,K
〉
;
6: Generate a key pair sk and pk;
7: Query2← 〈userID,X ,R,POI − type, pk〉
8: LBS Provider← Query1;
9: Third Party← Query2;
If the server calculates the POIs using r on the perturbed
dataset, we can see only r4 would be returned to the user,
which is wildly inaccurate. Therefore we need to find the
mapping f : r → rˆ , to make the relationship between
rˆ and the perturbed locations relatively consistent with the
relationship between r and the original locations.
Algorithm 5 shows the details. First, similar to the
k-nearest POI queries, the user’s location coordinates lt (x, y)
are perturbed to a location vector lp(c1, c2, . . . , cm) using
location perturbationmethod in Step 1. To construct the effec-
tive radius rˆ for the perturbed location, few points are chosen
randomly from the edge of the queried range in Step 2.Where
θ ∈ [0, 2pi ], to make the result more accurate, we choose
more than 4 points. Identically, we get the perturbed value
set sˆ by applying location perturbation algorithm again in
Step 3. In Step 4 calculates the average distance between the
perturbed location lp and the points in set sˆ, which is the
perturbed radius rˆ . The first query is generated in Step 5,
which includes the user’s ID, perturbed radius rˆ , and per-
turbed location. The user sends the range query with this
perturbed radius rˆ to the service provider in Step 6. Step
6 generates a key pair for POI information encryption and
the second query is generated in Steps 7. The second query is
a map sanitization query, which includes user ID, transition
matrix, safe region, POI type, public key. These two queries
are sent to the service provider and the third party separately
in Step 8 and Step 9 respectively.
2) MAP SANITIZATION
The third party perturbs the map using the same method as in
Algorithm 3 for the k-nearest POI queries. A smaller map is
sampled according to the user’s safe region and query type.
Then, perturb it using received transition matrix and send it
back to the service provider for POI searching. The specific
steps are shown in Section. IV-A2.
3) SEARCH NEARBY POIs
The service provider processes the range query with
Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 Response Range Query (LBS Server)
Require: User ID, ui’s perturbed location lp, radius rˆ
anonymized perturbed map Mˆa.
Ensure: anonymized POI POIsa.
1: for i = 1 to length(Mˆa) do
2: dis(i)← Euclidean distance between lp and ˆMa(i);
3: if d(i) < rˆ then
4: POIsa = POIsa ∪ ID(Mˆa(i));
5: end if
6: end for
7: Ps = {P1,P2, . . . ,PK }, where Pi ∈ Mˆa;
8: Repeat step 1 to 5 for each Pi;
9: Third Party← POIsa;
10: return POIsa
As shown in Algorithm 6, the distances between the user
and all the POIs are calculated in Steps 1 to 2. As long as
the distance d(i) 6 rˆ , the location is added to the set POIsa
in Step 4. Another K − 1 POIs are randomly selected within
perturbed map Mˆa(i) in Step 7, and the corresponding nearby
POIs are calculated in Step 8. All of the POIs are sent to
the third party. After that, the user can get the queried POIs
by the same way for k - nearest queries. Fig. 6 shows an
example of utility maintenance. After perturbation, the radius
rˆ accurately includes the POIs queried by the user.
FIGURE 6. JL transform for range queries with radius rˆ . (a) Original
locations. (b) Perturbed locations.
V. PRIVACY AND UTILITY
A. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: Algorithm 1 guarantees -differential privacy.
Proof: We prove that the output of the perturbation is
indistinguishable regardless of the input location. That is
Pr[M(L) ∈ ] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(L ′) ∈ ]. (6)
We observe that the perturbed location vector Lp is com-
posed of m identically distributed variable. Each variable is
created by multiplying the true location coordinate Lt with a
vector Mc ∈ R2. Therefore, we proof theorem 1 by showing
that each variable of the output satisfies 6.
As the entries of vector Mc are sampled from iid Gaus-
sian distribution N (0, σ 2), vector Mc follows the multi-
dimensional Gaussian distribution N (0, 6), where 6 =[
σ 2
σ 2
]
. According to the linear combination property
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FIGURE 7. Location placement.
of multi-dimensional Gaussian distribution, the transformed
variable Lpc v N (0,Lt6LTt ). Let Lt = (x, y), therefore,
Lt6LTt = (x2 + y2)σ 2. Denoted by λ2 = Lt6LTt , then,
Lpc v N (0, λ2). Let L ′t (x ′, y′) be the neighbouring dataset,
L ′pc v N (0, λ
′2) We have
Pr[M(L) ∈ ]
Pr[M(L ′) ∈ ] =
PDFL(x)
PDFL ′ (x)
=
1√
2piλ
exp(− x2
2λ2
)
1√
2piλ′ exp(−
x2
2λ′2 )
= λ
′
λ
exp(
x2
2
(
1
λ′2
− 1
λ2
)). (7)
When variance λ2 > λ′2,
Pr[M(L) ∈ ]
Pr[M(L ′) ∈ ] ≥
λ′
λ
= λ−1
λ
= 1− 1
λ
. (8)
0 = −ln(1− 1λ ).
When variance λ2 < λ′2,
Pr[M(L) ∈ ]
Pr[M(L ′) ∈ ] ≥
λ′
λ
= λ+1
λ
= 1+ 1
λ
.
1 = ln(1+ 1
λ
). (9)
As
1 − 0 = ln(1+ 1
λ
)+ ln(1− 1
λ
)
= ln(λ
2 −12
λ2
) < 0. (10)
0 > 1, Therefore,
e−0 ≤ Pr[M(L) ∈ ]
Pr[M(L ′) ∈ ] ≤ e
0 . (11)
Let  = 0, therefore, the proposed method satisfies
-differential privacy, where  = −ln(1− 1
λ
). 
B. UTILITY ANALYSIS
For POI queries, the returned POIs are based on the relative
distance between the users and the nearby POIs. Therefore,
the utility is evaluated by comparing whether the relative
distances between the users and the POIs have changed.
As shown in Fig. 7, given a user u, and two POIs a and
b around u, assume ‖ u − b ‖= t ‖ u − a ‖ and t > 1,
where ‖ u− a ‖ is the Euclidean distance du,a between u and
a. After the Johnson Lindenstrauss transform, the distances
between a and u and b and u are ‖ f (u) − f (a) ‖ and
‖ f (u) − f (b) ‖ separately. Then the probability of causing
an error is Pr[error] = Pr[‖ f (u)− f (a) ‖≥‖ f (u)− f (b) ‖].
According to Lemma 1,
Pr[‖ f (u)− f (a) ‖
≥ ‖ f (u)− f (b) ‖]
≤ Pr[‖ u− a ‖ √1+ δ ≥‖ u− b ‖ √1− δ]
= Pr[‖ u− b ‖‖ u− a ‖ ≤
√
1+ δ√
1− δ ]
= Pr[t ≤
√
1+ δ√
1− δ ] (12)
Pr[δ ≥ t
2 − 1
t2 + 1] (13)
As 0 < δ < 12 , therefore, 1 <
√
1+δ√
1−δ <
√
3. Variable δ is
defined by the user, therefore, the value of δ can be chosen
uniformly from (1,
√
3). So, we assume the variable δ obeys
uniform distribution.
Case 1: For a given δ, 1 <
√
1+δ√
1−δ <
√
3. As t > 1,
when t ≥ √3, Pr[t ≤
√
1+δ√
1−δ ] = 0. When t <
√
3,
we assume t obey uniform distribution in (1,
√
3), which is
reasonable, because t is the ratio of distances between two
POIs to the user. It can be an arbitrary value in the range
of (1,
√
3) according to different POI locations selection.
Therefore, Pr[t ≤
√
1+δ√
1−δ ] =
√
1+δ√
1−δ−1√
3
. Equation 12 can be
written as
Pr[error] ≤

0 t ≥ √3√
1+ δ√
3
√
1− δ −
√
3
3
t <
√
3
As
∂(
√
1+δ√
3
√
1−δ −
√
3
3 )
∂δ
=
√
3
6
√
1+ δ +√1− δ
1− δ > 0, (14)
Therefore, for a given δ, when t ≥ √3, the probability
of cause an error is 0; when t <
√
3, the greater the δ is,
the higher the error probability is. According to the Johnson
Lindenstrauss Lemma, m = (log(n)/δ2). We can infer that
for a fixed n, m ∼ 1
δ2
. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion
that greater value of m helps to reduce the error probability.
Case 2: For a given t , where t > 1. Equation 15 can be
written as
Pr[‖ f (u)− f (a) ‖ ≥ ‖ f (u)− f (b) ‖]
≤ Pr[t ≤
√
1+ δ√
1− δ ]
= Pr[δ ≥ t
2 − 1
t2 + 1]. (15)
As 0 < δ < 12 , when
t2−1
t2+1 ≥ 12 , that is t ≥
√
3, Pr[δ ≥
t2−1
t2+1 ] = 0. When 1 < t <
√
3, Pr[δ ≥ t2−1
t2+1 ] = 3−t
2
t2+1 .
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Equation 15 can be written as
Pr[error] ≤
0 t ≥
√
3
3− t2
t2 + 1 t <
√
3
As
∂ 3−t2
t2+1
∂t = − 8t(t2+1)2 < 0, when t <
√
3, the error proba-
bility is monotonically decreasing with the increasing of t .
Which means the larger the proportional distance between
two POIs, the higher the accuracy achieved.
Overall, when t ≥ √3, the Johnson-Lindenstrauss trans-
form cause no error. When t ≤ √3, the greater the m and the
greater the t , the smaller the error rate.
VI. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
We evaluated the performance of our privacy framework
through an extensive set of experiments. First, we present
the experiment settings, and then discuss the experimental
results.
Datasets: We used two real-world datasets. SimpleGeo
Places dataset [13] and Yelp business dataset [14]. We
extracted 8275 business entries in the area of Sydney from
SimpleGeo dataset, and 22830 business entries in Las Vegas
from Yelp dataset.
Metrics: The effectiveness of the proposed method was
evaluated by comparing the similarities between the result
sets. We evaluated the accuracy of our method in terms of
displacement, resemblance [15] and recall.
1) Resemblance. Let P = {p1, p2, . . . pk} be the POI set
retrieved by the POI query, relative to the true location
lt of the user u, andP′ = {p′1, p′2, . . . p′k} be the retrieved
POI set based on the perturbed location. Resemblance
measures the fraction of POIs in the actual result set
that is included in the approximated result set.
Resemblance = |P ∩ P
′|
|P| , (16)
where |P| is the size of the set P.
2) Displacement. Displacement measures how closely P
is measured by P′ on average. It shows the average
difference between the real POIs distance across the
mismatched POIs on k − NN query.
Displacement = 6
k
i=1‖lt − pi‖ −6ki=1‖lt − p′i‖
|P| ,
(17)
where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean distance between the true
location of the user and the location of the POI.
3) Recall. We use recall to evaluate the proportion of
relevant POIs retrieved on range query.
Recall = Resemblance = |P ∩ P
′|
|P′| , (18)
where the length of P can be different from P′.
Experimental Setup: We used 1000 users to retrieve the
k-nearest POIs and POIs in a region with an r radius corre-
sponding to the true and perturbed locations. For the Simple-
Geo dataset, we choose Restaurant and Shopping locations as
interesting POIs and 1000 users were chosen randomly from
the Professionals attribute. For the Yelp dataset, we choose
Nightlife and Beauty & Spas as interesting POIs and 1000
users were chosen randomly from Restaurants. All of these
query strings reflect different POI densities. Given the pro-
posed method is based on a random mapping, we repeat each
experiment 20 times and used the average to ensure accuracy.
All algorithms were implemented in Matlab on a PC with
2.7 GHz Intel Core i5 Processor and 8 GB Memory. Table 3
shows the parameters used.
TABLE 3. Parameter settings.
We compared our method to two other differential privacy-
based methods with a client-server structure, as no other
similar technique applying a semi-trusted third party.
1) The Geo-indistinguishability method. This concept was
proposed by Andrés et al. [16] in 2013. It states
that for any x and x ′ within radius r , the distance
d(K (x),K (x ′))between the corresponding distributions
should at most be l, where the mechanism K is a
probabilistic function for selecting a reported value,
and l = r . One idea proposed by Chatzikokolakis
et al. [17] for achieving geo-indistinguishability is that
whenever the actual location is x0, instead, a point x
is randomly generated instead, according to the planar
Laplace noise function.
2) A simple Laplace method. In this approach, the user’s
location is perturbed by adding Laplace noise to the x
and y coordinates independently. The noise is deter-
mined by the privacy parameter  and sensitivity s,
where the sensitivity equals the radius r , so that the user
cannot be distinguished with from other users within r .
To make these methods comparable, we assumed the
neighbor location l ′(x ′, y′) in our method was within the
radius r of true location l(x, y). Then, 1 = |√x ′2 + y′2 −√
x2 + y2|  λ. Therefore,   1. We made  = 0.5 for
all methods. The maximum radius calculated in paper [17]
is 2km; therefore, r = 2km in the simple differential privacy
method. Our method and the two other methods are denoted
as JL, GEO, and DP, respectively.
A. PERFORMANCE OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
1) k-NN QUERY
We examined the performance of the proposed method in
relation to the number of queried POIs k for k-NN queries
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FIGURE 8. k-NN query performance. (a) Restaurant (SimpleGeo). (b) Shopping(SimpleGeo). (c) Nightlife (Yelp). (d) Beauty & Spas (Yelp).
(e) Restaurant (SimpleGeo). (f) Shopping(SimpleGeo). (g) Nightlife (Yelp). (h) Beauty & Spas (Yelp).
in terms of resemblance and displacement. We varied the
number of queried POIs between 1 and 50 in Step 1 on both
datasets.
The resemblance values corresponding to different values
of k for both the SimpleGeo and Yelp datasets are shown
in Figs. 8a, 8b, 8c, and 8d. It is clear that JL significantly
outperformed GEO and DP in all configurations. As shown
in Fig. 8a, when k = 5 and nearby Restaurants were queried
from the SimpleGeo dataset, GEO achieved a resemblance
of 0.2560, DP achieved a resemblance of 0.0850, and JL
achieved a resemblance of 0.8582, which outperformed GEO
by 60% and DP by 77%. A similar result was also observed
when measuring resemblance on the Yelp dataset. Obviously,
GEO and DP performed very badly when k < 10 on both
datasets, but they were greatly improved by increasing the
value of k . However, the number of queried POIs had little
effect on JL in terms of the resemblance metric. The JL
method always performed well, even when k was small,
because its utility is related to the dimensions m and t ,
as shown in Section V-B. For a fixed m, a larger t helped
maintain a higher accuracy and was not affected by the size
of k .
The displacement values corresponding to different values
of k on both the SimpleGeo and Yelp datasets are shown in
Fig. 8e, 8f, 8g, and 8h. We observed that JL had a much lower
displacement value than both GEO and DP when querying
all attributes on the two datasets. Additionally, we observed
that the size of k did not affect the performance of JL sig-
nificantly in terms of the displacement metric, while GEO
and DP increased faster when k decreased from 20 to 1. For
example, in Fig. 10a, the displacement JL achieved across all
values of k was under 20m. However, when k = 5, GEO
and DP achieved displacements of 181.4295 and 642.0554,
respectively, much larger than the displacement values of
83.3879m for GEO and 367.0430m for DP when k = 20.
A similar observation was found in Fig. 8f, 8g, and 8h. This
indicates that a smaller k means a larger difference between
the returned POIs based on the true location and the false
location for both the GEO and DP methods. JL had no such
problem. The same observation was made when considering
performance in terms of the resemblance metric.
The proposed JL method has such excellent performance
because it simultaneously perturbs the user’s location and
the POI locations by mapping them to different dimensions
instead of reporting false locations. And the relative distances
between records are nearly preserved. However, any method
that reports a false location will have a large margin of error
when querying only a few nearby POIs, especially when the
distribution of the queried POIs is compact. It is easy to
deduce that the closest POI to the true location is not the
closest one to the false location.
2) RANGE QUERY
We further examined the performance of the proposed
method in relation to the radius r for range queries in terms of
resemblance and recall. We varied the radius r between 100m
and 1000m in steps of 100 on both datasets.
The resemblance results of the three methods on the Sim-
pleGeo and Yelp datasets are shown in Fig. 9a, 9b, 9c, and
9d. Obviously, JL had a higher resemblance value than the
other two methods-irrespective of the value of r . For the JL
method, the resemblance metric was stable and close to 1
even with an increasing r , which indicates the dataset’s utility
was not overly sacrificed, and the accuracy of the returned
POIs was mostly enhanced. However, as shown in Fig. 9a,
when r < 600, neither GEO nor DP maintained good utility.
Specifically, when r = 800, GEO and DP achieved resem-
blances of 0.8291 and 0.2712, respectively. JL achieved a
resemblance of 0.9569, an improvement of 13% and 68%,
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FIGURE 9. Range query performance. (a) Restaurant (SimpleGeo). (b) Shopping(SimpleGeo). (c) Nightlife (Yelp). (d) Beauty & Spas (Yelp).
(e) Restaurant (SimpleGeo). (f) Shopping(SimpleGeo). (g) Nightlife (Yelp). (h) Beauty & Spas (Yelp).
respectively. When r = 300, JL achieved a resemblance
of 0.9001, outperforming GEO by 60% and DP by 84%.
These improvements by JLwere observed on theYelp dataset.
As shown in Fig. 9d, when r = 400, GEO and DP achieved
resemblances of 0.2560 and 0.2347, respectively. JL outper-
formed them by 70% and 72% with a resemblance of 0.9548.
When r = 800, JL achieved a resemblance of 0.9521, which
is an improvement of 43% and 66% over GEO and DP’s
resemblances of 0.5291 and 0.2935, respectively. Figs. 9e,
9f, 9c, and 9d show the results for the SimpleGeo dataset in
terms of recall. We observed that the performance of the three
methods was similar to the results of the resemblance metric.
JL outperformed GEO and DP across all r values. JL was
relatively stable compared to GEO and DP - they changed
significantly when varying the radius r .
We attribute the reason JL performed so well to the prop-
erties of the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform. The distances
between the locations were almost fully preserved after the
transformation, regardless of the queried radius r . However,
in the GEO and DP methods, if the queried range is very
small, it is possible for there to be no overlap between the true
POIs and the perturbed POIs. So, the JL method outperforms
GEO and DP significantly when r is small.
B. THE IMPACT OF POI DENSITY
To examine the impact of POI density on the three methods
for both k-NN queries and range queries. We choose three
attributes that reflect different POI densities in the SimpleGeo
and Yelp datasets.
1) k-NN QUERIES
The resemblance and displacement values corresponding to
the three methods in two datasets by querying three different
k-NN POIs when k = 20 are shown in Figs. 10a - 10d.
The POI density had little effect on JL; however, it affected
the GEO and DP significantly. As shown in Fig. 10a, JL’s
resemblance value increased slightly when increasing the POI
density, while the resemblance value decreased significantly
for the GEO and DP methods. Specifically, in Fig. 10a, JL
achieved approximately 0.83 resemblance for all POI queries
on the SimpleGeo dataset. While, when querying Restau-
rant, the resemblance achieved by GEO was 0.6730. When
querying nearby Shopping andHealth Service, GEO achieved
resemblances of 0.1960 and 0.1159, respectively, a decrease
of 48% and 8%. The resemblance achieved by DP decreased
by approximately 30% and 5%. The resemblance results
on the Yelp dataset closely resembled those on SimpleGeo,
shown in Fig. 10c. Accordingly, the displacement decreased
slightly for JL and increased significantly for both GEO and
DP. As shown in Fig. 10b, JL achieved displacements of
20.0431, 6.0760, and 3.9532 for Restaurant, Shopping, and
Health Service, respectively. While GEO achieved 83.3879,
199.6278, and 236.7437, an increase of around 116 and 27
when increasing the POI density. DP achieved 367.0430,
670.1029, and 689.0549, an increase of 303 and 19.
Because for GEO and DP methods, when the density
increased, more mismatched POIs reduced the accuracy.
However, for JL method, the k nearest POIs were much
closer to the user as the density increased. Therefore, the pro-
portion of the distances became slightly larger compared to
low-density distribution. According to our utility analysis,
accuracy increases as the distance proportionally increases
between two POIs and the user.
2) RANGE QUERY
The effects of the POI density on the range query are shown in
Figs. 10e - 10h. It is clear that the POI density had no obvious
impacts on JL for both datasets. For example, JL achieved
VOLUME 6, 2018 29695
M. Yang et al.: Differential Private POI Queries via Johnson–Lindenstrauss Transform
FIGURE 10. The effect of density on the k-NN and range queries. (a) SimpleGeo/k-NN. (b) SimpleGeo/k-NN. (c) Yelp/k-NN. (d) Yelp/k-NN.
(e) SimpleGeo/range. (f) SimpleGeo/range. (g) Yelp/range. (h) Yelp/range.
a resemblance of approximately 0.89 for all three different
POI queries in Fig. 10e on SimpleGeo dataset, and achieved
a recall of approximately 0.86 in Fig. 10f. Similar results
can be observed in Fig. 10g and Fig. 10h on Yelp dataset.
However, there was a different result for GEO and DP. Both
resemblance and recall slight changed on SimpleGeo dataset,
but had a significant reduction in the performance when
increasing the POI density of the queries on Yelp dataset. For
instance, the GEO method achieved a resemblance of 0.5600
when querying nearby Nightlife; however and reduced to
0.2560 when querying Beauty & and Spas. The performance
was much worse when querying Restaurants, which has the
largest density. The DP method had similar results. Fig. 10h
shows a similar trend in terms of recall.
As we mentioned, for a given m, the performance of JL
is only related to the ratio of distances between the user
and POIs t . The change of POI density cannot affect the JL
performance significantly for range query.
C. IMPACT OF TRANSITION MATRIX M
In the proposed method, m is an important parameter that
determines the length of the perturbed location vector. To
determine how m contributed to the results, we changed the
value of m from 2 to 50 in steps of 4 on both the SimpleGeo
and Yelp datasets.
The results on SimpleGeo and Yelp for the k-NN queries
are shown in Fig. 11. JL’s performance was greatly improved
by increasing the value of m. When the dimension of the
transition matrix increased, resemblance showed an upward
trend on both datasets. As shown in Fig. 11a, when m = 2
for SimpleGeo querying nearby POIs resulted in a resem-
blance of 0.7.Whenm is increased, the resemblance increases
rapidly. When m = 14, the resemblance = 0.9. Performance
started to level off with an m higher than 14. A similar result
FIGURE 11. The effect of m on k-NN and range queries. (a)
SimpleGeo/k-NN. (b) Yelp/k-NN. (c) SimpleGeo/range. (d) Yelp/range.
is observed when querying nearby POIs on the Yelp dataset.
As shown in Fig. 11b, when m is in the range of [2, 14],
the changes in resemblance are significant. The query result
is much more accurate when the dimensions of the transition
matrix are much higher. When it reaches a threshold, perfor-
mance is not expected to improve dramatically. Fig. 11d and
Fig. 11d show the results of the range queries on two datasets.
We can observe that the increasing parameterm has a positive
effect on performance. For instance, in Fig. 11c, whenm = 2,
resemblance is around 0.82. When m = 10, a resemblance of
0.91 is achieved.
The relationship between the two fixed POIs did not
change, which means t is invariable. According to the analy-
sis in Section V-B, when t is fixed, the probability of an error
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FIGURE 12. Computational cost of the proposed method.
(a) Computational cost by varying k. (b) Computational cost by varying K.
decreases with the increase in the value ofm. Therefore, when
m becomes larger, the error probability is reduced, and better
performance is achieved.
D. OVERHEAD ANALYSES
In this section, we analyse the computational cost, query
process delay and transmission overhead induced by the
proposed privacy framework. There are three processes may
cause the delay: map sanitization, POI encryption, and POI
decryption. Because in the map sanitization process, only
the queried POIs in the safe region are transformed by the
transition matrix, the time cost is very short that can be
ignored. Therefore, we tested the computational cost of POI
encryption and POI decryption under the proposed privacy
framework by varying the number of queried POIs and num-
ber of dummy POI sets.
Fig. 12 shows the results. The dark blue regions in the bars
indicate the computational cost at the third party for encrypt-
ing the POI information. The yellow regions in the bars indi-
cate the computation burden at the user side for decrypting the
received POI information. Therefore, the whole bars indicates
the overall query response time, that is the delay induced by
the proposed privacy framework.
Fig. 12a hows the computation time cost by varying the
number of queried POIs, where K = 3. We can observe that
the time cost is increasing with the increase of the number k ,
no matter the encrypt time or decrypt time. This is because
when the number of queried POIs increases, the number
of POIs needed to be encrypted and decrypted increases.
Therefore, both time costs are increasing. Fig. 12b shows the
computation time cost by varying the number of dummy POI
sets, where k = 5. We observe that the encrypt time increases
with the increase of number K , however, the decrypted time
does not change. This is because the user only needs to
decrypt the queried POIs. When the number of queried POIs
does not change, the time cost caused by decryption does not
change.
It’s clear that the whole query response time is very short
that was controlled within few seconds. The delay induced
by the proposed privacy framework is negligible compared
with tradition encryption-based method. This is because in
the proposed method, the encryption technology is only
used to hide the POI information. It was never used to
calculate or search the POI records. In addition, only few POI
records are encrypted instead of the whole region. Also, there
is no big transmission overhead, because only the queried
POIs in a safe region and limited encrypted POIs are trans-
mitted between the service provider and the third party.
VII. RELATED WORKS
Numerous techniques have been provided to protect a user’s
location privacy [7], [18]–[22]. The current main techniques
for preserving privacy in LBSs are described in the following
review.
Most proposed methods are designed to operate in client-
server structures. In dummy location methods, multiple false
locations along with the user’s true location are sent to the
LBS server such that the true location cannot be distinguished
from the false locations [18]. Obfuscation techniques try to
protect a user’s location by reducing the precision of the posi-
tion information, reporting a region to the LBS server instead
of the precise user location [23]. Beyond the cloakingmethod,
Gutscher [24] proposed a coordinate transformation method.
The user performs some basic geometric operations over their
positions, such as shifting and rotating, before sending it to
the LBS server. Differential privacy-based perturbation meth-
ods have also been proposed. Dewri [3] proposed a method
that perturbs the user’s location by adding Laplace noise to
the x and y coordinates independently. Andrés et al. [16]
introduced the notion of geo-indistinguishability to formal-
ize the problem of protecting a single user’s position. It
achieves privacy by adding controlled noise to the user’s
location making the user’s location indistinguishable within
a radius r [17]. Private information retrieval-based proto-
cols [25] were also proposed for POI queries. This technique
allows a user to retrieve a record from a database server
without revealing any information about the query. However,
such cryptography-based approaches rely on heavy crypto-
graphic mechanisms, which are often computationally and
communicatively expensive.
A few privacy-preserving techniques have attempted to
user trusted third parties (TTP) for location-based services.
The most commonly used TTP approaches rely on an
anonymizer to create a spatial region that includes at least
k − 1 other users to hide the true location [19]. Because
k-anonymity is achieved, an adversary can only identify a
user’s true location with probability no higher than 1/k .
Papadopoulos et al. [26] employed trusted hardware to per-
form PIR for LBS queries. Their hardware-aided PIR tech-
nique relies on a trusted third party to set a secret key and
permutate the database. However, the third party is aware
of the precise user positions and is, therefore, vulnerable
to misbehavior by the fully-trusted third party. Recently,
Schlegel et al. [27] proposed a dynamic grid system to pro-
vide privacy-preserving continuous LBS. They introduced
a semi-trusted third party, responsible for simple matching
operations. However, their method is based on complicated
cryptographic functions, which is, as previously mentioned,
carries a heavy computational burden.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new privacy preservation
framework that includes three elements: a user, a third party,
and the LBS server. The third party is a semi-trusted entity
based on a weak assumption that it does not collude with the
LBS server. In addition, we propose a novel privacy protec-
tion scheme, based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform.
Moreover, the user’s exact location is perturbed by Johnson-
Lindenstrauss which satisfies the definition of differential pri-
vacy, and maintains high level application utility at the same
time. The combination of privacy preservation method and
client-bridge-server structure ensure that none of the party
is aware of the user’s exact location. Our method supports
two very popular queries: k-nearest-neighbour queries and
range queries. Performance is evaluated through extensive
experiments, and our proposed method is further compared
to two representative differential privacy-based methods. The
results demonstrate that our framework provides better pri-
vacy guarantees and ismore efficient in terms of resemblance,
displacement, and recall.
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